¿Jugamos en el mismo equipo? Los Nobel de economía y la teoría de juegos

  1. Francisca Jiménez Jiménez 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Jaén

    Universidad de Jaén

    Jaén, España

    ROR https://ror.org/0122p5f64

Revista de Estudios Empresariales. Segunda época

ISSN: 1988-9046

Year of publication: 2012

Issue: 2

Pages: 116-129

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista de Estudios Empresariales. Segunda época



  • Social Sciences: C


This work is aimed at offering an overview of the major contributions of Game Theory to the understanding of cooperation and conflict in social dilemmas. In particular, we emphasize some studies carried out by the most outstanding researchers who have been recognized with the Nobel Prize in Economics. For that, we use the well known “tragedy of the commons” as our benchmark strategic setting or game.

Bibliographic References

  • Aumann, R. (1964): “Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games", in Advances in Game Theory. Ed: Dresher, M., Shapley, L. S. y Tucker, A. W., Princeton University Press.
  • Fehr, E. y Schmidt, K. M. (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:3, pp. 817-68.
  • Hardin, G. (1968): “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162, pp. 1243-48
  • Kahneman, D. y Tversky, A. (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk”, .Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-291.
  • Kahneman, D. (2012): Pensar Rápido, Pensar Despacio, Trad. Joaquín Chamorro Mielke, Ed: Debate.
  • Nasar, S. (1998): A Beautiful Mind: A Biography of John Forbes Nash Jr., Ed: Simon y Schuster, New York.
  • Nash, J. F. (1950): “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 18, pp. 155-62.
  • Nash, J. F. (1951): “Non-cooperative Games”, Annals of Mathematics, 54, pp. 286-95.
  • Neumann, J. von and Morgentern, O. (1944): The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Ed: Princeton University Press, Princeton.
  • Ostrom, E. (1990): Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Ed: Cambridge University Press, New York.
  • Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B. y Policansky, D. (1999): “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges”, Science, 284, pp. 278-82.
  • Rabin, M. (1993): “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics”, American Economic Review, 83:5, pp. 1281-302. Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. y Nowak, M. A. (2012): “Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed”, Nature, 489, pp. 427-430.
  • Schelling, T. (1960): The Strategy of Conflict. Ed: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Samuelson, P. (1983): Foundations of Economic Analysis, Enlarged Edition, Ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
  • Smith, V. (2000): Bargaining and Market Behavior, Essays in Experimental Economics (Collected works), Ed. Cambridge University Press, New York.
  • Tversky, A. y Kahneman, D. (1974): “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, Science, 27:185, pp. 1124-31.