Neurociencia cognitivadiferencias entre distintas poblaciones en tareas de toma de decisiones

Resumen

El cerebro es un dispositivo de contrastes de hipótesis, que confronta de modo continuo el procesamiento de abajo-arriba (o entrada sensorial) con el procesamiento de arriba-abajo (expectativas previas o formulación de hipótesis). De manera que de modo continuo estas dos corrientes de información se comparan realizando un contraste de hipótesis. El objetivo principal de esta tesis era mostrar que el ajuste a la realidad o la objetividad (congruencia entre interpretaciones y hechos) dista de ser perfecto en los seres humanos. Podemos clasificar a los grupos humanos en función de la magnitud de este desajuste, por eso estudiamos las diferencias existentes entre distintas poblaciones en la toma de decisiones en función de variables demográficas muy generales: género, edad, creencia religiosa, ideología política o rasgos de personalidad como la esquizotipia; aunque centrándonos en el estudio de los sesgos cognitivos (tareas sobre salto a conclusiones, sobre sesgo contra la evidencia desconfirmatoria o a favor de la evidencia confirmatoria, toma de riesgos, impulsividad¿), pero concentrándonos más detenidamente en el estudio del sesgo cognitivo ¿Salto a conclusiones¿, a través, de una tarea modificada con respecto a la tarea original llamada ¿Drawing Decision Task¿ (DDT o PDT en español) de Moritz y Woodward (2006). Además de los parámetros clásicos (índice de plausibilidad y de llegada a una decisión, BADE/BACE), esta división nos permitió calcular nuevos parámetros, en concreto, el número de respuestas correctas en la etapa 8 y la sensibilidad a la retroalimentación. Nosotros elegimos esta tarea porque nos daba una gran oportunidad de estudiar más exhaustivamente estos sesgos y entender mejor los mecanismos subyacentes a estos. En nuestra investigación el sesgo cognitivo salto a conclusiones se ha visto relacionado con el rasgo de personalidad esquizotipia, con el sexo masculino, creer en Dios y tener una orientación política conservadora. De modo que las personas que más saltan a conclusiones o muestran más sesgos cognitivos son hombres, creyentes de la tercera edad y alta esquizotipia. 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