New rules for calculating contributions to deposit guarantee schemes in European application to the Spanish banking system

  1. Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado 1
  2. Antonio Partal-Ureña 1
  3. Antonio Trujillo-Ponce 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Jaén Departamento de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad
  2. 2 Departamento de Economía Financiera y Contabilidad. Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Journal:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Year of publication: 2016

Volume: 45

Issue: 4

Pages: 389-414

Type: Article

DOI: 10.1080/02102412.2016.1205247 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

More publications in: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

Este trabajo analiza los efectos que tendría sobre el sistema bancario español la nueva forma de calcular las contribuciones bancarias a los sistemas de garantía de depósitos establecida en la Directiva Europea aprobada en 2014. Nuestra muestra comprende algo más del 90% de los depósitos cubiertos en España durante el período comprendido entre 2008 y 2014. Para el análisis, seguimos las directrices publicadas por la Autoridad Bancaria Europea en 2015, donde se proponen dos métodos diferentes para calcular las ponderaciones de riesgo: el método de las “categorías” y el método de la “escala variable”. Concluimos que la mayoría de los bancos verían aumentar sus contribuciones al fondo de garantía de depósitos con el nuevo sistema, basado en contribuciones ajustadas al riesgo, lo que indicaría la existencia de un subsidio por parte de las entidades de menor riesgo en el sistema de aportaciones fijas. Por otro lado, el método de las “categorías” sería el que proporcionaría mayores incentivos para una gestión prudente del riesgo. Finalmente, se concluye también que el nuevo sistema podría reducir el riesgo “moral” a menudo asociado a los bancos de mayor tamaño.

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